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Abstract 
The dual problems of respecting citizen privacy and protecting the confidentiality of their data 
have become hopelessly conflated in the “Big Data” era. There are orders of magnitude more data 
outside an agency’s firewall than inside it—compromising the integrity of traditional statistical 
disclosure limitation methods. And increasingly the information processed by the agency was “asked” in 
a context wholly outside the agency’s operations—blurring the distinction between what was asked and 
what is published. Already, private businesses like  Microsoft, Google and Apple recognize that 
cybersecurity (safeguarding the integrity and access controls for internal data) and privacy protection 
(ensuring that what is published does not reveal too much about any person or business) are two sides 
of the same coin. This is a paradigm-shifting moment for statistical agencies. 
Preliminaries 
I would like to thank the Washington Statistical Society, the National Association for Business 
Economics, and the Business and Economics Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association for 
honoring me with the 2016 Julius Shiskin Memorial Award. The award explicitly cites my contributions to 
Statistical Disclosure Limitation (SDL) and increasing access to valuable individual, business, and job 
microdata. I want to take a moment at the beginning of this talk to acknowledge several colleagues, past 
and present, without whom much of this work would never have occurred.  
The first of these is Nancy Gordon, who was the Associate Director for Demographic Programs 
when I first joined forces with the Census Bureau in 1998 and who remains a trusted friend and 
colleague to this day. I consider her my mentor in the federal statistical system. Nancy was part of a 
team of Associate Directors that included current Census Bureau Director John Thompson and Deputy 
Director Nancy Potok. Those senior Census executives understood that the Bureau needed to modernize 
and that modernization meant looking beyond traditional business models. But Nancy understood two 
other things that she articulated as well as anyone in the federal statistical system: (1) new methods of 
collecting microdata, whether it be the continuous measurement of the American Community Survey or 
the administrative records-based Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program—two programs 
she particularly championed—would require creative new methods for accessing and publishing data 
and (2) the research activities associated with modernizing access and publication methods—specifically 
confidentiality protection through multiple access modes and creative new SDL methods—had to be 
                                                          
1Associate Director for Research and Methodology and Chief Scientist, U.S. Census Bureau and Edmund Ezra Day 
Professor of Economics, Statistics and Information Science, Cornell University. The opinions expressed in this talk 
are my own, not those of the Census Bureau. Research support from the National Science Foundation (SES 
1131848, TC 1012593), the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the U.S. Census Bureau (prior to my appointment) is 
gratefully acknowledged. I have benefitted from numerous conversations with Cynthia Dwork, Steve Fienberg, 
Matthew Graham, Sam Haney, Dan Kifer, Mark Kutzbach, Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Kobbi Nissim, Jerry Reiter, Ian 
Schmutte, and Lars Vilhuber. 
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done by those with a subject-matter interest in the data. It took me 16 years to prove the theorem that 
embodies those insights, and yes I am going to show it to you today. Thank you, Nancy, for dragging me, 
sometimes quite reluctantly, into this arena. My understanding of how the responsibilities of an official 
statistical agency should be discharged owes a huge debt to you. 
The second person I want to acknowledge is my long-time Cornell colleague Lars Vilhuber. Lars 
is my intellectual grandchild—his thesis supervisors at the Université de Montréal were two of my 
former doctoral students. He came to the Census Bureau in 1999 as part of the first team of economists 
hired by the LEHD Program.  
It was clear from the very beginning that Lars was cut from different cloth than most of the 
other economists or survey statisticians at the Census Bureau. He understood the intimate connection 
between doing research on confidential microdata and documenting all the sources and methods to 
standards that would permit a researcher who was completely unfamiliar with any part of the work to 
reproduce it beginning with the original inputs as delivered from their original sources. This duty is an 
imperative for any organization that grants research access to its confidential microdata—if the 
scientific community, which cannot directly peer-review this research, loses confidence in its 
reproducibility, it will be very difficult to restore that confidence. 
In 1999, Lars, in collaboration with my colleagues at the Cornell Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, designed and implemented the first Virtual Research Data Center, called the Cornell 
Restricted-Access Data Center. After he had left the Census Bureau and was working as a Cornell 
employee under contract to the Bureau, he and two other Census contractor colleagues designed the 
metadata database that still drives the LEHD data acquisition and production systems—a marvel that is 
able to reproduce any of the released statistics from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators back to the 
beginning of time (2003) from the actual inputs and codebase as they existed when that release was 
produced. These are two seminal early contributions to applied information science that deserve explicit 
commendation from the social science community. Thank you, Lars, for having the intellectual fortitude 
to insist that the research infrastructure was as critical to the mission of a statistical agency as its data 
publications. 
I also want to explicitly acknowledge two former students, Simon Woodcock, now at Simon 
Fraser University, and Ian Schmutte, now at the University of Georgia.  
Simon was the one who realized that synthetic data had “legs.” Our early work, published in 
2001, laid the groundwork for the synthetic data projects undertaken with the Census Bureau in the 
mid-2000s. These systems paved the way for the formally private ones we are now developing for 
flagship Census Bureau publications.  
Ian and I are currently working on the social science underlying disclosure limitation. I’m going 
to be talking about that work extensively today. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the role of Stephen Fienberg of Carnegie-Mellon University. 
I’m sure almost everyone in this auditorium can cite a path-breaking contribution of Steve’s that had a 
major impact on statistics and the federal statistical system. I want to highlight the foresight that he had 
in gathering researchers from the SDL community and the emerging computer science data-privacy 
community in Bertinoro, Italy, in 2005. This is where I first met Cynthia Dwork and the team of young 
cryptographers who were shattering the received wisdom in SDL with methods that Steve recognized as 
revolutionary. I’m also going to spend much of this lecture on those methods. The last time Steve and I 
talked about this, at this year’s JSM, he confided to me that our big mistake was that “we did not grow 
the community fast enough.” I hope this lecture helps solve that problem too. 
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The Social Science of Data Privacy 
To understand why statistical agencies are facing a paradigm-shifting challenge we need to 
examine the origins of privacy research in economics and confidentiality protection in statistics and 
computer science. 
The intellectual giant of information economics, George Stigler, produced the first rigorous 
analysis of the economics of privacy in 1980 using, as Richard Posner noted in 1981, a legal analysis of 
privacy based on an individual’s incentive to conceal personal details from trading partners, like banks, 
and law enforcement agencies—governments. In 1980, more than a decade before the Internet, he said 
“[g]overnments (at all levels) are now collecting information of a quantity and in a personal detail 
unknown in history” (p. 623). While acknowledging that governments played a valuable role when they 
published statistics about their populations, Stigler correctly predicted that the problem would be how 
to constrain the use of this private information rather than how to defend against its acquisition in the 
course of law enforcement. 
It is not just governments that face a paradigm shift. In the private sector, the rise of Internet-
intermediated commerce, especially through market giants like Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft, Twitter, and the late Yahoo bestowed upon these intermediaries an information advantage 
over the buyers that Alessandro Acquisti and Hal Varian described, in 2005, as privileging the seller’s 
informational position in a manner that allows price discrimination on a massive scale. That price 
discrimination happens every time one of these giants offers you a “special deal.” A recent survey by 
Acquisti and co-authors (2016) focuses almost exclusively on the private value of the information that 
Internet giants have acquired through voluntary exchanges with consumers who shared the information 
as part of a mutually-beneficial commercial transaction. They spend just a few paragraphs on the 
scientific value of these commercial databases and similar ones that government agencies now possess. 
They conclude that “[h]ow to balance researchers’ and society’s needs to access granular data with the 
need to protect individuals’ records is a question that simultaneously involves economists and scholars 
in other disciplines, such as statisticians and computer scientists” (p. 43).  
Indeed it does. 
Data collected by statistical agencies must be published in some form. The enabling legislation 
for a statistical agency makes that obligation clear. A statistical agency cannot use the data that it 
acquires to enforce laws. This prohibition lies at the heart of their second statutory obligation: to protect 
the confidentiality of the identity and attributes of individual and business data sources.  
Publications are the public good that justifies the expense of taxpayer revenue on the agency. 
And the quality of those publications, measured in terms of their usefulness to the society that financed 
them, is the social benefit from that public good.  
Confidentiality protection is also a public good. Or, more pointedly, Stigler’s privacy protection—
protection from harmful use of private data—is the public good that is also produced when a statistical 
agency discharges its statutory mission by publishing summaries that have been altered using statistical 
disclosure limitation methods. 
It is easy to see why the quality of an agency’s statistical data is a public good. Better quality 
data allow all users to make better decisions. And when one of these users does so, that person doesn’t 
use up any of the data quality. It is all still there for the next user. There is no rivalry in the consumption 
of quality statistical data. There is also no plausible excludability. Any person in the world can download 
data from the American Community Survey, the Economic Census, the National Income Accounts, the 
Consumer Price Index, and a host of other statistics produced by our agencies. 
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It is harder to see why privacy protection is a public good, and indeed, it need not be. In this 
country, and in most western democracies, the ideal of equal protection under the law is an important 
safeguard built into the justice system. When a statistical agency is charged with protecting the 
confidentiality of the individuals and businesses from whom it collects data, the equal protection 
provision matters. The agency cannot, without explicit authorization in law, disadvantage one person by 
publishing his private data while simultaneously safeguarding the privacy of another. The requirement 
that every person obligated to supply data is entitled to the same confidentiality protection when those 
data are published translates into non-rivalry in consumption for privacy protection because the 
technology is implemented using worst-case analysis. Whatever mechanism an agency designs for 
protecting the confidentiality of its data safeguards that confidentiality precisely when one person’s 
protection doesn’t come at the expense of another person’s (or business’s). That is non-rivalry in 
consumption—I can’t use up your confidentiality protection by invoking mine. If I could, we wouldn’t be 
equally protected under the legal mandate of Title 13 or CIPSEA. 
In a minute, I will begin my discussion of the technologies that limit the feasible production of 
quality statistics and privacy protection. Before I do, I want to stress that there are always two sides to 
an economic analysis—supply and demand. The technology determines the supply of quality statistics 
and privacy protection. What determines the demand? 
The Census Bureau produces the American Community Survey, for example, as part of the 
constitutionally mandated decennial census—the part specifically mandated by the instruction to 
conduct the enumeration “in such a manner as they [Congress] shall by law direct.” What part of 
American society benefits from the data published as part of the ACS? The answer is clearly those 
subpopulations, places, towns, counties, cities, states and regions that use the data or the funds 
allocated in part based on those data to make better decisions and to enforce laws protecting the rights 
of residents of those places.  
The demand for the ACS is a derived demand for a public good—quality data on many 
subpopulations. The demand for the Economic Censuses is a derived demand for quality data on 
economic activity as reflected in the National Income and Product Accounts and other measures. The 
demand for the Current Population Survey is a derived demand for quality data on the state of the labor 
market at high frequency.  
We are used to thinking of the cost of these public goods as the taxpayers’ willingness to spend 
money on data collection as manifested by their representatives’ willingness to fund the various data 
collection activities. But there is a much subtler cost that matters just as much. Holding constant the 
spending on the ACS, for example, the most accurate way to release the data would be to publish the 
exact microdata as collected. Such a publication would have no privacy protection, since the ACS is a 
mandatory survey, and would clearly be a violation of the Census Bureau’s current statutory 
confidentiality protection mandate. But the same Congress that directed the collection of the ACS could 
also direct its publication in full detail. Congress could legislate that the social interest in data quality 
outweighs all countervailing interests in privacy protection. It is a social choice about demand not about 
technology: “Does Congress want to direct statistical agencies to sacrifice some data quality in order to 
provide privacy protection?” not “Can statistical agencies do this if so directed?” 
Congress has mandated both data publication and privacy protection. It has, however, given 
little guidance as to how a statistical agency might reflect a social choice for better data quality at the 
expense of some privacy loss. Navigating our way through this social choice is what the second half of 
this lecture is about. I hope it might influence policymakers into thinking more proactively about how to 
provide legislative guidance on privacy-loss choices. 
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What Is an Inferential Disclosure? 
Just as I began the section on the social science of data privacy with its intellectual 
underpinnings in the economics of privacy, I want to begin the analysis of the technology of producing 
quality data with privacy protections by noting the roots of this problem in statistics and computer 
science. And unsurprisingly, that takes us right to Ivan Fellegi, in many ways one of the most influential 
official statisticians of the 20th Century. In 1972, Fellegi showed that publishing too many related 
summary tables could, if the agency did not take care in their preparation, lead to what he called a 
“residual disclosure”—what we would now call a differencing (or subtraction) attack in computer 
science or a complementary disclosure in SDL: a user could exactly reconstruct at least one confidential 
data record from the published data. 
By proving that a combination of primary and complementary suppressions in the published 
tables could produce publications that were free from residual disclosure, Fellegi provided the first tool 
in the field of statistical disclosure limitation. And he opened the door for statistical agencies around the 
world to structure their published tables in a manner that satisfied the prevailing standards of 
confidentiality protection. 
Fellegi also provided the first practical example of what is now known in computer science as 
the Fundamental Law of Information Reconstruction or, sometimes, the Database Reconstruction 
Theorem. First proven by Irit Dinur and Kobbi Nissim in 2003, this result states that it is possible to 
reconstruct any finite confidential database to within an arbitrary level of accuracy using a finite series 
of queries.  
Consider a series of tables protected by primary and complementary suppression. Each time one 
of these suppressions is relaxed, a record in the underlying database can be, at least partially, 
reconstructed. In 2010, Scott Holan and his co-authors provided a direct example of how suppression 
could be almost completely undone by database reconstruction as applied to the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages. Ian Schmutte and I (2015a) showed similar results for the Quarterly Workforce 
Indicators and County Business Patterns. None of these reconstructions resulted in an exact disclosure—
direct identification of an attribute of a particular respondent because the SDL had been properly 
implemented. But this line of research taken in combination with the Fundamental Law of Information 
Reconstruction implies that statistical agencies need stronger theoretical underpinnings for their 
confidentiality protection technologies. And I’m sure that most of you are aware of famous database 
reconstructions like the one Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov accomplished in 2008 using the 
Netflix Prize data, which did result in many exact re-identifications. 
Enter the concept of inferential disclosure—the modern method for quantifying the incremental 
information contained in a data release. First introduced by Tore Dalenius in 1977, an inferential 
disclosure occurs when the user of a statistic can make too improved an inference about a respondent’s 
identity or attributes once the data have been released as compared to the best possible inference 
before the statistic was published. In 1982, Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali defined a cryptogram as 
semantically secure if the information about the actual message (cleartext) that could be extracted from 
the encrypted text could also be extracted without using the encrypted text.  
Perfect inferential disclosure limitation and perfect semantic security are intimately related; 
indeed, they are really the same thing. And they are both impossible to achieve in any statistical 
publication. What I like to call the Impossibility Theorem was first proven by Cynthia Dwork and Moni 
Naor in 2008, but a simpler version of the argument lies behind the original papers in differential 
privacy: Cynthia’s work with Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim and Adam Smith in 2006, and her paper 
entitled “Differential Privacy” in 2006. 
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The impossibility theorem begins by quantifying the amount of information about any 
respondent or attribute released in any published statistic using the Bayes factor associated with that 
statistic when it is computed with and without the contribution of that respondent. The theorem then 
states that any published statistic for which this Bayes factor is unity for all possible respondents in all 
possible configurations of the data has provably zero inferential disclosure or, equivalently, full semantic 
security. That is, any statistic that is perfectly safe—zero inferential disclosure or perfect semantic 
security—is also perfectly useless: it is a full encryption of the confidential data. It is impossible to fully 
control inferential disclosure. 
It is simple to relate inferential disclosure to the more common notions of identity and attribute 
disclosure. Inferential disclosure can be quantified by the Bayes factor associated with the hypothesis 
that a particular respondent’s values are or are not in the database used to compute a particular 
statistic. An exact identity disclosure occurs when the Bayes factor associated with this hypothesis is 
infinite. A similar definition implies that an exact attribute disclosure has occurred when its associated 
Bayes factor is infinite. 
The result that differential privacy works by bounding a particular Bayes factor has been so 
poorly understood, and sometimes maligned, in the practice of SDL, that I want to take some time to 
clarify its meaning and explain why it is the most important result in disclosure limitation since Fellegi’s 
initial contribution.  
Consider a confidential database, D, where rows are respondents and columns are variables. 
Consider another database D’ where the data on respondent i has been deleted. The difference 
between databases D and D’ is, therefore, the data on a single respondent whose row has been deleted 
from D’. 
Now consider a pre-defined set of tabulations F. We will do this in its simplest form. F contains 
the formulas for computing one statistic from D. For simplicity, imagine that F allows only subpopulation 
totals—counting the selected rows of D where some combination of the data in that row conforms to 
the conditions of the query. For example, our counting query could be all men in the database, all 
women living in Texas with a college education, etc. 
Finally, let M be a disclosure limitation system that uses output noise infusion. M takes as inputs 
D and F and outputs the statistic S = a + u. That is, M takes D, makes the computations according to F to 
produce the exact answer a, then adds noise u.  
Suppose the databases D and D’ both produce the same statistic S. The Bayes factor for the 
hypothesis that respondent i was used to compute statistic S is just 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃[𝐷𝐷|𝑆𝑆,𝑀𝑀,𝐵𝐵]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃[𝐷𝐷′|𝑆𝑆,𝑀𝑀,𝐵𝐵]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃[𝐷𝐷|𝑀𝑀,𝐵𝐵]
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃[𝐷𝐷′|𝑀𝑀,𝐵𝐵]  
That is, the Bayes factor is equal to the odds for D v. D’ a posteriori divided by the odds a priori. The 
incrementa2l event is the publication of S. By convention, we exchange D and D’ so that the Bayes factor 
is always at least one. 
Our publication system M might be structured so that the Bayes factor for every respondent i, 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖, is bounded by some constant, say 𝑒𝑒𝜀𝜀. Our publication system would then have the property, given 
D, that for all D’ sup𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝜀𝜀 
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That is, the Bayes factor associated with the hypothesis that respondent i was used to compute the 
statistic S from D never exceeds 𝑒𝑒𝜀𝜀. 
We might think that bounding the Bayes factor for all possible respondents in a given database 
is sufficient to make a quantitative statement about confidentiality protection. But, as in the case of 
survey design, we really want to know how the system M works for any database D we might collect—
just as we try to understand the theoretical error from a particular survey design over all possible 
realizations of the sample data. So, let’s modify the condition on the Bayes factor so that we can say  sup∀𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷′{sup𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖} ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝜀𝜀 
The databases are defined exactly as above but now the bound says that for any pair of databases D and 
D’ that differ by the deletion of a single respondent and for any choice of that respondent, the Bayes 
factor is always bounded by 𝑒𝑒𝜀𝜀 . 
A disclosure limitation system M that satisfies this Bayes factor bound for all input databases D 
that can be produced by the data collection system under study is called 𝜀𝜀-differentially private. It is the 
leading example of a privacy-preserving data publication system. Some useful generalizations can be 
found in the Pufferfish system of Daniel Kifer and Ashwin Machanavajjhala (2014). 
The bound in 𝜀𝜀-differential privacy is a worst-case bound. Why should we use such a worst case 
as the standard for a disclosure limitation system? The answer lies in a remarkable paper published by 
Arpita Ghosh and Aaron Roth in 2011. They asked the sensible question: Suppose a scientist wants to 
compute a simple statistic from a database already held by a trusted custodian. The custodian has said 
that the scientist may offer monetary compensation to the respondents already in the database to 
induce them to opt-in to the calculation. The custodian must compute the statistic using 𝜀𝜀-differential 
privacy. 
Ghosh and Roth set the problem up so that the scientist determines the minimum expenditure 
to produce a statistic with given accuracy defined over the whole population. Each respondent has a 
unique distaste for privacy loss. Each respondent is offered a pair of outcomes {𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖}—a privacy 
guarantee and a payment. The solution to the minimum expenditure problem is a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
(VCG) auction in which every willing participant receives the same payment and gets the same level of 
privacy protection. The payment and protection are determined by the marginal participant in the 
calculation of the statistic. That marginal participant has the largest distaste for privacy loss of all willing 
participants, and the number of willing participants is just large enough to achieve the desired accuracy 
relative to the population value of the statistic. 
The result in Ghosh and Roth implies that the privacy loss in 𝜀𝜀-differential privacy is non-rival. 
Every member of the population gets at least the protection offered to the least-willing participant. In 
order to buy more accuracy, more participants have to opt-into the calculation. To get them to do so, 
the privacy loss offered to the marginal participant must be reduced (smaller 𝜀𝜀). Once that happens, 
everyone in the population gets more privacy protection because in order to insure that the marginal 
participant gets the promised level of privacy protection the statistic must be computed using the 
smallest value of 𝜀𝜀 offered to any participant. This is the value offered to the marginal participant; 
hence, that participant is determining the privacy loss for all members of the population, not just 
himself.  
Optimal Data Quality and Privacy Protection 
Armed with the knowledge that privacy protection is a non-rival public good, we can now ask 
the question: What is the optimal level of data quality and privacy protection? This is a different 
question from the one that Ghosh and Roth asked. They allowed the scientist buying the statistic to set 
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the level of data quality to meet her desired accuracy. The scientist is, in their setup, a private data 
supplier. She is going to publish the statistic once for the benefit that it affords her career. Her 
willingness to pay for that statistic is determined entirely by her private motivation to pay for it, just as 
Google sells advertising space surrounding search results based on the highest bidder’s willingness to 
pay to advertise to the specific person whose search results are about to be published. 
We already saw that data quality, especially the quality of data published by statistical agencies, 
is a public good. The right amount of data quality to publish might very well be more than any one 
person would be willing to buy. Ian Schmutte and I (2015b) proved that this intuition is correct. Here is 
the theorem that Nancy Gordon presaged in 1998. 
The technology for jointly producing data quality and privacy protection defines a production 
possibilities frontier (PPF) along which increased data quality requires increased privacy loss—larger 𝜀𝜀. 
The slope of this PPF measures the marginal social cost of increased data accuracy in terms of foregone 
privacy protection. Statisticians have another name for this curve—the Risk-Utility map (Duncan and 
Fienberg 1999). I’m an economist, so I am not going to use the term “utility” that way. They mean “data 
quality” or “suitability for use,” not utility the way economists define the term. It turns out that 
statisticians also have another name for this curve—the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve. I’ll 
make this analogy clear when I get to my example. 
The preferences for data quality and privacy protection come from a social welfare function that 
aggregates every person’s preferences for data accuracy and distaste for privacy loss. The slope of the 
isovalue curves from this social welfare function defines the marginal willingness to pay for incremental 
data quality with incremental privacy loss in the whole population.  
Optimal data quality and privacy protection occur when the marginal social cost of incremental 
data quality, measured in terms of incremental privacy loss, equals the marginal willingness to pay for 
incremental data quality, also measured in terms of incremental privacy loss. 
Using this setup, Ian and I proved that the VCG auction from Ghosh and Roth described the 
correct technology for jointly producing data quality and privacy protection. This means that if a 
statistical agency uses the PPF associated with the best-known differentially private data publication 
mechanism, it is provably producing the best quality statistics possible using a technology with formal 
bounds on the population loss of privacy. If it uses an ad hoc SDL method, it is provably sacrificing either 
data quality or privacy protection or both. 
We also proved that a statistical agency should produce higher quality statistics than a private, 
profit-maximizing data publisher would produce. The agency should also impose the required increase 
in privacy loss to achieve the improved quality. A private supplier, like the scientist in the original Ghosh 
and Roth work, only buys enough data quality to meet her private goals. But the general population can 
reuse her statistic many times. For example, if the statistic is the conditional cure rate for a particular 
cancer therapy, one might imagine that many physicians and patients would reuse that number. 
Similarly, many property developers might reuse data on the proportion of households with income in 
excess of $200,000/year in a particular place. The sum of the willingness to pay for all of the uses of a 
statistic determines the demand side of the socially optimal choice of data quality and privacy loss. 
Can You Do This with Real Data? 
Yes. In fact, the Census Bureau was the very first organization in the world to implement a 
production data publishing system that was formally private (Machanavajjhala et al. 2008). 
Figure 1 (based on results in my 2015b paper with Ian) shows the complete solution for 
publishing the distribution of income in 1,000 bins using the differentially private algorithm known as 
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private multiplicative weights. The x-axis measures the privacy loss, parameterized as the maximum log 
Bayes factor for any adult in the United States—the 𝜀𝜀 in differential privacy. Hence, the x-axis measures 
a public “bad”—privacy loss. The y-axis measures data quality stated as the absolute error when the 
statistic is produced with the differentially private method divided by the absolute error when the 
statistic is produced with an infinite privacy loss.  
The point (0,1) represents the unattainable best outcome: perfect accuracy and no privacy loss. 
The point (1,0) represents the worst outcome shown: no data accuracy at all with a privacy loss of 𝑒𝑒1, a 
bound on the Bayes factor of 2.72. 
 
Figure 1 
Publishing Income Data with Differential Privacy 
The PPF shows the feasible pairs of data quality and privacy loss. It should now be clear why I 
used the ROC analogy above. We would like to attain the point (0,1), which is also the best outcome in 
the ROC case—false positive rate of zero and true positive rate of unity.  
The PPF in Figure 1 uses accurate parameters for the 2010 population of the United States ages 
18-64 varying the 𝜀𝜀 parameter in the differentially private data publication mechanism. It passes 
through (0,0), as it must. It asymptotically approaches data quality of one as privacy loss goes to infinity. 
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Infinite privacy loss means the published data attain the same quality as statistics computed from the 
confidential data directly. 
Two isovalue curves for the social welfare function are shown. The one labeled SWF0 is just 
tangent to the PPF. It represents the socially optimal data quality-privacy loss pair. The one labeled SWF1 
is the inferior social welfare level that would be achieved by a private publisher who overprotected 
privacy by using a differential privacy value that was too low while computing the same statistic. 
We estimated the social welfare function using two different sources of data: the 2006 General 
Social Survey (Smith et al., 2011) and the Federal Statistical System Trust Survey (Childs et al., 2012 and 
2015). The pictured results are for the GSS. Marginal distaste for privacy loss was measured by the 
answer to the following question: 
“The federal government has a lot of different pieces of information about people which 
computers can bring together very quickly. Is this a very serious threat to individual privacy, a 
fairly serious threat, not a serious threat, or not a threat at all to individual privacy?” 
Marginal preferences for data accuracy were measured by answers to this question: 
“How important [is] the following in making something scientific? The conclusions are based on 
solid evidence.” 
The results imply that the adult population of the U.S. prefers data that are 90 percent as 
accurate as those that would be produced with infinite privacy loss. At the same time, the population 
prefers privacy loss of 𝜀𝜀 = 0.067, a Bayes factor of 1.07. The point (0.90, 0.067) is just feasible, and 
therefore can be attained using the posited differentially private publication mechanism. Results using 
the FSS Trust Survey, which has somewhat different questions and is much more current, imply that the 
adult population would prefer slightly less accurate statistics and slightly less privacy loss. 
A Research Program for Modernizing Disclosure Limitation 
Almost all current disclosure limitation methods used by statistical agencies around the world 
are based on ad hoc criteria for measuring their effectiveness. They fail the criterion of equal protection 
under the law because their effectiveness is measured in terms of an agency’s best efforts to insure that 
the ensemble of publications does not violate the confidentiality of any respondents. Those best efforts, 
while diligently and competently delivered, were predicated on the assumption that most of the 
information that could be used to compromise the disclosure limitation procedure was inside the 
agency’s firewall.  
Such an assumption is simply no longer tenable. It must be replaced by assumptions that allow 
the agency to release the statistical summaries without fear of future attacks. Formally private 
disclosure limitation procedures meet this condition. And they are really the only players left standing.  
Formally private systems always respect the Fundamental Law of Information Reconstruction. 
This means that they state a privacy-loss budget for all publications based on a particular confidential 
database. Then, they provably respect that budget. There are no exact identity or attribute disclosures 
by construction. All publications cumulatively imply a stated privacy loss. And that privacy loss is 
guaranteed against all future external data and attacking algorithms.  
We need to guard against the violations of the Fundamental Law of Information Reconstruction 
that arise from doing an incomplete analysis of the data publication problem. I’m thinking, in particular, 
of the analysis many researchers and agencies do when considering whether it is safe to publish 
summary results from an additional study using a confidential data source. We usually hear this 
incomplete analysis as some form of the question “How can my six regression coefficients possibly 
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compromise the confidentiality of these data?” It is a reasonable reaction, but the argument is flawed 
because it is a partial equilibrium analysis. Each publication, compared to no publication at all, involves a 
small but measurable privacy loss. The cumulative effect of this partial equilibrium reasoning is either a 
strong limitation on the ensemble of publications or a violation of the Fundamental Law of Information 
Reconstruction. If we can’t measure how much privacy loss has already been incurred, can we 
reasonably hope to make a rational decision about whether the next publication is still safe? And either 
way, how do we decide which analyses to publish and which to limit in order to respect the privacy-loss 
budget? 
Formally private publication systems automatically allow correct inferences about the published 
data and automatically share all new results with the public. There is nothing secret about the disclosure 
limitation process except the seed for the random number generator used to create the noise in the 
publication tables and microdata. The complete statistical process can be published and combined with 
other sources of error to produce real measures of total variability. At present, key parameters of the 
SDL, like swap rates and algorithms, are closely guarded secrets. The published data have deliberate 
disclosure limitation errors, but we don’t talk about them or release any information that might be used 
to correct inferences even though these systems may have infinite privacy loss in a formal setting. Ad 
hoc SDL methods like swapping are technically dominated once an agency agrees to limit its publications 
to those that are within a stated privacy-loss budget, even a very large one like 10 (Bayes factor bound = 
22,000). 
Formally private publication systems provide statistical agencies with the tools needed to 
deliver both data quality and privacy protection in a manner consistent with their statutory missions. 
They do not help the agencies decide which data quality, privacy-loss combinations to use. Those 
decisions require a model of the demand-side of data publication. The computer scientists are silent on 
this subject. They are waiting for the social scientists to provide models and data suitable for making this 
choice. I have just shown you some examples. Let’s not keep the computer scientists, or the statistical 
agencies, waiting any longer for better ones. Thank you. 
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